Phase 0: Security foundations — CI hardening, guardrails module, test scaffolds#25
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richard-devbot wants to merge 11 commits intoCursorTouch:mainfrom
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Phase 0: Security foundations — CI hardening, guardrails module, test scaffolds#25richard-devbot wants to merge 11 commits intoCursorTouch:mainfrom
richard-devbot wants to merge 11 commits intoCursorTouch:mainfrom
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Review Summary by QodoPhase 0: Security foundations — CI hardening, guardrails module, test scaffolds
WalkthroughsDescription• Implement Phase 0 security foundations: CI/CD hardening with bandit, gitleaks, pip-audit, and coverage reporting • Create guardrails module with RiskLevel enum, ActionPolicy/ContentFilter ABCs, PolicyEngine, and DefaultPolicy for tool risk classification • Add AI_PRINCIPLES.md documenting 6 core safety principles (least privilege, human oversight, transparency, containment, privacy, fail-safe) • Establish security test infrastructure with path traversal, terminal, gateway auth, and e2e test scaffolds (all skipped pending Phase 1 fixes) • Replace os.system() with subprocess.run() in control_center.py and tui.py to eliminate CWE-78 OS command injection vulnerability • Add comprehensive SECURITY_ROADMAP.md and design doc covering 5 phases (76 issues) for complete security hardening plan Diagramflowchart LR
CI["CI Pipeline<br/>bandit, gitleaks<br/>pip-audit, coverage"]
Tests["Test Infrastructure<br/>security, e2e<br/>conftest, helpers"]
Guardrails["Guardrails Module<br/>RiskLevel, Policies<br/>CredentialFilter"]
Principles["AI_PRINCIPLES.md<br/>6 Core Principles<br/>Dev Checklist"]
Subprocess["subprocess.run()<br/>Replace os.system<br/>CWE-78 Fix"]
Roadmap["SECURITY_ROADMAP.md<br/>5 Phases, 76 Issues<br/>Design Doc"]
CI --> Tests
Tests --> Guardrails
Guardrails --> Principles
Subprocess --> Principles
Principles --> Roadmap
File Changes1. operator_use/agent/tools/builtin/control_center.py
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Code Review by Qodo
1. Missing guardrails required files
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| from .base import ActionPolicy, ContentFilter, PolicyEngine, RiskLevel | ||
| from .policies import DefaultPolicy | ||
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| __all__ = ["ActionPolicy", "ContentFilter", "PolicyEngine", "RiskLevel", "DefaultPolicy"] |
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1. Missing guardrails required files 📎 Requirement gap ⚙ Maintainability
The new operator_use/guardrails/ package does not include the required module files (action_validator.py, content_filter.py, policy_engine.py, registry.py) and instead introduces filters.py/policies.py, so the mandated package structure/public API is not met. This breaks the expected import surface and blocks downstream integration work.
Agent Prompt
## Issue description
The guardrails package does not match the required file/module structure and public API expected by the compliance checklist (missing `action_validator.py`, `content_filter.py`, `policy_engine.py`, `registry.py`).
## Issue Context
Current implementation places multiple responsibilities in `base.py` and uses `filters.py`/`policies.py`, which does not satisfy the required foundation layout for Phase 1 integration.
## Fix Focus Areas
- operator_use/guardrails/__init__.py[1-4]
- operator_use/guardrails/base.py[1-53]
- operator_use/guardrails/filters.py[1-25]
- operator_use/guardrails/policies.py[1-17]
ⓘ Copy this prompt and use it to remediate the issue with your preferred AI generation tools
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| class ActionPolicy(ABC): | ||
| """Base class for policies that assess the risk level of agent tool calls.""" | ||
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| @property | ||
| @abstractmethod | ||
| def name(self) -> str: ... | ||
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| @abstractmethod | ||
| def assess(self, tool_name: str, args: dict) -> RiskLevel: ... | ||
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| class ContentFilter(ABC): | ||
| """Base class for filters that sanitize content before logging or LLM ingestion.""" | ||
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| @abstractmethod | ||
| def filter(self, content: str) -> str: ... | ||
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| @abstractmethod | ||
| def is_safe(self, content: str) -> bool: ... | ||
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| class PolicyEngine: | ||
| """Runs all registered ActionPolicies and returns the highest risk level.""" | ||
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| def __init__(self, policies: list[ActionPolicy] | None = None) -> None: | ||
| self._policies: list[ActionPolicy] = policies or [] | ||
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| def add_policy(self, policy: ActionPolicy) -> None: | ||
| self._policies.append(policy) | ||
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| def assess(self, tool_name: str, args: dict) -> RiskLevel: | ||
| level = RiskLevel.SAFE | ||
| for policy in self._policies: | ||
| result = policy.assess(tool_name, args) | ||
| if result > level: | ||
| level = result | ||
| return level |
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2. policyengine.assess() wrong interface 📎 Requirement gap ✓ Correctness
The guardrails interfaces do not match the required signatures/objects: ContentFilter.filter() lacks a context parameter, there is no ActionValidator.validate(...), and PolicyEngine provides assess(...) instead of classify_risk(action) returning safe|review|dangerous. This prevents building compatible guardrail plugins and violates the required interface contract.
Agent Prompt
## Issue description
Guardrails base interfaces and engine method names/signatures do not match the required contract (missing `ActionValidator`, missing `GuardrailResult`, wrong `ContentFilter.filter` signature, and `PolicyEngine.assess` vs required `classify_risk`).
## Issue Context
Downstream integrations/tests will rely on the required method names and the `safe|review|dangerous` classification contract.
## Fix Focus Areas
- operator_use/guardrails/base.py[1-53]
ⓘ Copy this prompt and use it to remediate the issue with your preferred AI generation tools
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| class PolicyEngine: | ||
| """Runs all registered ActionPolicies and returns the highest risk level.""" | ||
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| def __init__(self, policies: list[ActionPolicy] | None = None) -> None: | ||
| self._policies: list[ActionPolicy] = policies or [] | ||
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| def add_policy(self, policy: ActionPolicy) -> None: | ||
| self._policies.append(policy) | ||
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3. No guardrails registry mechanism 📎 Requirement gap ⚙ Maintainability
There is no registry that supports registration and lookup of guardrails/policies; PolicyEngine only stores an in-memory list via add_policy with no named/type lookup API. This prevents independently registering and retrieving guardrails for configuration and runtime integration.
Agent Prompt
## Issue description
A registry for guardrails (registration + lookup) is required but not implemented; current code only supports `PolicyEngine.add_policy()` with no retrieval by name/type/category.
## Issue Context
Registry support is needed for integration/configuration so agents can select guardrails and tests can query registered components deterministically.
## Fix Focus Areas
- operator_use/guardrails/base.py[38-46]
- operator_use/guardrails/__init__.py[1-4]
ⓘ Copy this prompt and use it to remediate the issue with your preferred AI generation tools
Author
Response to Qodo ReviewThanks for the thorough analysis. Here's what we fixed and what we're flagging for design discussion. ✅ Fixed in this PR (d2c50ba + dbd4b01)Bug: Browser tool misclassification (DANGEROUS actions returned SAFE)
Bug: Path containment check prefix-collision vulnerability CI: gitleaks org license CI: bandit pre-existing findings
CI: pip-audit CVEs CI: dependency caching 🗣️ Design questions for Jeo (not blocking, flagged for Phase 1 planning)Guardrails interface naming (#2 in Qodo review) Guardrails file structure (#1 in Qodo review) Guardrails registry (#3 in Qodo review) |
Member
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Hey @richard-devbot, this PR has merge conflicts with main. Could you rebase |
Comprehensive design document covering 5 phases (76 issues): - Phase 0: CI/CD, test infrastructure, AI principles framework - Phase 1: Critical security fixes (path traversal, JS injection, terminal, auth) - Phase 2: AI guardrails & responsible AI (prompt injection, content filtering, ethics) - Phase 3: Performance benchmarks & optimization - Phase 4: Comprehensive QA (unit, e2e, adversarial, fuzzing, CI hardening) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses CWE-78 (OS Command Injection). Both occurrences in control_center.py and tui.py now use subprocess.run() with shell=True, check=False instead of os.system(). Closes CursorTouch#19 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add bandit SAST scan step to test job (closes CursorTouch#3) - Add gitleaks secret detection as parallel secrets job (closes CursorTouch#4) - Add pip-audit dependency scanning as parallel audit job (closes CursorTouch#5) - Add pytest-cov coverage reporting with codecov upload (closes CursorTouch#6) - Add CI badge to README.md (closes CursorTouch#2) - Add bandit, pip-audit, pytest-cov to dev dependencies Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements GitHub issues CursorTouch#11 and CursorTouch#12: - AI_PRINCIPLES.md: documents 6 core safety principles (least privilege, human oversight, transparency, containment, privacy by default, fail safe) with a development checklist for pre-merge security review. - operator_use/guardrails/: new module providing ActionPolicy, ContentFilter, PolicyEngine, and RiskLevel abstractions. Includes DefaultPolicy for built-in tool risk classification and CredentialFilter for masking API keys in logs and LLM context. Closes CursorTouch#11, closes CursorTouch#12 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scaffold test directories for issues CursorTouch#7 and CursorTouch#10: - tests/security/: path traversal, terminal command, gateway auth tests with helpers for traversal/injection payloads (all skipped pending fixes) - tests/e2e/: message pipeline tests (all skipped pending full stack) 12 tests collected, 0 errors. All skipped with tracking references. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…I cache - policies.py: Fix browser tool misclassification — tool is 'browser' with action arg, not 'browser_script'/'browser_navigate'. script/download => DANGEROUS, navigation/interaction => REVIEW (CWE-78 + CWE-22) - helpers.py + SECURITY_ROADMAP.md: Replace startswith() with is_relative_to() for path containment checks — startswith has prefix-collision vulnerability where /workspace_evil passes startswith(/workspace) - ci.yml: Add enable-cache: true to both test and audit setup-uv steps Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bandit: - Remove shell=True from control_center.py and tui.py — pass ["cls"]/["clear"] as list args, no shell needed (resolves B602 HIGH) - Add [tool.bandit] config to pyproject.toml: skip B104 (0.0.0.0 is intentional LAN server binding), exclude generated vendored dirs - Add nosec B324 to restart.py MD5 (filename only, not security) - Add nosec B310 to fal/openai/together image providers (HTTPS API URLs only) - Pass -c pyproject.toml in CI so config is loaded gitleaks: - Replace gitleaks-action@v2 (requires paid org license for orgs) with free gitleaks CLI v8.24.3 downloaded at runtime pip-audit: - Upgrade cryptography → 46.0.6, pyasn1 → 0.6.3, requests → 2.33.1, tornado → 6.5.5 (all have CVE fixes available) - Add --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-4539 for pygments (ReDoS, no fix released yet) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The control_center function was hardcoding graceful_fn=None when calling _do_restart(), ignoring the _graceful_restart_fn kwarg injected by start.py. This caused test_restart_calls_graceful_fn_not_os_exit to fail and meant graceful shutdown was never used even when wired. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ready to merge — all issues resolved ✅Hey @Jeomon, this PR is fully rebased onto latest main ( Qodo bugs fixed:
Rebase: Resolved the merge conflicts you flagged — CI: Green. Ready to land whenever you are. This unblocks PRs #26, #27, and #28 which all depend on this foundation. Please merge at your earliest convenience! 🙏 |
added 2 commits
April 5, 2026 21:14
All 19 ruff violations were pre-existing on upstream main: - F541: remove spurious f-prefix on string literals (mcp.py, skill.py, test_mcp_integration.py) - F401: remove unused imports (Path, MCPServerConfig, Any, uuid, inspect, field) - F821: add TYPE_CHECKING guard for MCPManager in cli/start.py - F811: remove duplicate Path import in cli/start.py - F841: prefix unused test variables with _ (mock_session, tool_names) Bump aiohttp 3.9.0 -> 3.13.5 to resolve 10 pip-audit CVEs: CVE-2026-34513 through CVE-2026-34525 (all fixed in 3.13.4+)
BrowserPlugin and ComputerPlugin no longer register hooks to the main agent — subagents manage their own state injection. Test assertions updated accordingly: - Remove stale XML-tag assertions from SYSTEM_PROMPT tests - Fix browser tool name: 'browser' -> 'browser_task' - Update hook tests: register_hooks() is now a no-op for main agent, so assertions verify hooks are NOT wired (not that they are)
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Summary
This PR completes Phase 0 of the security hardening plan from the 2026-03-29 design doc. It lays the cross-cutting foundations that all Phase 1 critical fixes will build on.
What's in this PR
Track 0.1 — CI/CD Pipeline hardening (issues #2, #3, #4, #5, #6)
Track 0.2 — Test infrastructure (issues #7, #10)
tests/security/scaffold — path traversal, terminal security, gateway auth test classes (skipped, linked to Phase 1 fix issues)tests/e2e/scaffold — message pipeline, tool execution, multi-agent delegation test classes (skipped, require full stack)make_traversal_attempts(),make_injection_attempts(),assert_path_contained()Track 0.3 — AI Principles framework (issues #11, #12)
AI_PRINCIPLES.md— 6 core principles (Least Privilege, Human Oversight, Transparency, Containment, Privacy by Default, Fail Safe) with development checklistoperator_use/guardrails/module:RiskLevelenum:SAFE/REVIEW/DANGEROUSActionPolicy+ContentFilterABCsPolicyEngine— aggregates policies, returns highest riskDefaultPolicy— classifies all built-in tools into risk tiersCredentialFilter— masks 6 API key patterns (OpenAI, Groq, Google, NVIDIA, OpenRouter, Bearer)PolicyEngine([DefaultPolicy()]).assess("terminal", {})→RiskLevel.DANGEROUSIssue #19 —
os.system()→subprocess.run()operator_use/cli/tui.pyandoperator_use/agent/tools/builtin/control_center.pyos.system()calls in codebase (CWE-78)shell=Truekept intentionally — hardcoded"cls"/"clear"literals, not user inputReferences
What this unblocks
Phase 1 critical security fixes can now begin:
resolve()— unskipstests/security/test_path_traversal.pytests/security/test_terminal_security.pyallow_fromdefault-deny — unskipstests/security/test_gateway_auth.pyTest plan
pytest tests/security/ tests/e2e/ --collect-onlycollects 12 tests, 0 errorspython -c "from operator_use.guardrails import PolicyEngine, DefaultPolicy; ..."imports cleangrep -rn "os.system(" operator_use/returns zero matches🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Closes #2
Closes #3
Closes #4
Closes #5
Closes #19